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Class Based Adjudication of Title VII Claims in the Age of the Roberts Court
Michael C. Harper1
I. Introduction
Title VII’s most significant set of amendments, the Civil Rights Act of 1991,2
was in substantial part a response to decisions of the Rehnquist Court issued
during its 1988 1989 term, including the especially controversial Wards Cove
Packing Co., Inc. v. Antonio.3 While the Roberts Court also has issued a number of
opinions interpreting employment discrimination laws contrary to the advocacy
of civil rights advocates,4 its decisions on substantive employment discrimination
law have been mixed5 and have not provoked a cry for a new set of
comprehensive amendments.
None of the Roberts Court’s interpretations of substantive law, however,
seems to have the potential of doing as much damage to the promise of the
amended Title VII as do several rulings of the Roberts Court on procedural issues.

1

Professor of Law and Barreca Labor Relations Scholar, Boston University School of Law.
Pub. L. No. 012 166, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified at various sections of U.S.C.) (hereinafter 1991
Act).
3
490 U.S. 642 (1989).
Section 2(2) of the 1991 Act asserted that “the decision … in Wards Cove … has
weakened the scope and effectiveness of Federal civil rights protections.” Section 3 stated that
a purpose of the Act was “to respond to recent decisions of the Supreme court by expanding
the scope of relevant civil rights statues.” See, e.g., id. § 101, overturning the holding in
Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164 (1989); id., § 107, modifying the holding in Price
Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989); id., § 108, modifying the holding in Martin v.
Wilks, 490 U.S. 755 (1989); id. § 112, modifying the holding in Lorance v. AT&T Technologies,
490 U.S. 900 (1989). See generally Reginald C. Govan, Honorable Compromises and the Moral
High Ground: The Conflict Between the Rhetoric and the Content of the Civil Right Act of 1991,
46 Rutgers L. Rev. 1 (1993).
4
See, e.g., Vance v. Ball State University, 133 S. Ct. 2434 (2013); University of Texas
Southwestern Medical Center v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517 (2013); Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557
(2009); Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618 (2007). Ledbetter has been
reversed by Congress. Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, Pub.L. 111 2, 123 Stat. 5 7.
5
See Staub v. Proctor Hospital, 131 S.Ct. 1186 (2011); Crawford v. Metropolitan Government of
Nashville, 555 U.S. 271 (2009); Burlington Northern v. White, 548 U.S. 53 (2006).
2
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These rulings include both the Court’s application of Rule 23,6 the Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure (FRCP) governing class actions, to a Title VII case, Wal Mart Stores,
Inc. v. Dukes,7 and also the Court’s interpretation of the Federal Arbitration Act
(FAA)8 in a series of decisions, including AT & T Mobility LLC v. Vincent
Concepcion9 and American Express Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant.10
In this paper I want to examine the nature of this damage and ask what
legislative response to the Roberts Court’s procedural decisions would most
benefit employment discrimination claimants. Did the Wal Mart decision, as
claimed by some,11 like Wards Cove, substantially restrict the force of preexisting
Title VII law? Did it render almost impossible the prosecution of Title VII private
class actions seeking any form of monetary relief, and thereby in effect deny
many victims of Title VII proscribed discrimination the opportunity for
compensation, as claimed by others?12 Or do the Court’s interpretations of the
FAA provide most employers with the more substantial barrier against class based
private actions under Title VII?
My conclusions are that the importance of the Wal Mart decision for
private class action litigation, while significant, has been exaggerated. The Wal
Mart Court’s applications of Rule 23, while unfavorable to plaintiffs, were
predictable and did not substantially modify any well established Title VII law. The
Wal Mart decision, furthermore, does not prevent the prosecution of Title VII
class actions; at least without further restrictive interpretations, Rule 23 still
affords plaintiffs and conscientious federal judges the flexibility to utilize class
6

Fed. R. Civ. P. 23.
546 U.S. xxx, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011).
8
9 U.S.C. §§ 1 16.
9
131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011).
10
133 S. Ct. 2304 (2013).
11
See, e.g., A. Benjamin Spencer, Class Actions, Heightened Commonality, and Declining Access
to Justice, 93 B. U. L. Rev. 441 (2013); Tristin K. Green, The Future of Systemic Disparate
Treatment Law, 32 Berk. J. of Emp. and Lab. L. 395 (2011); Noah Zatz, Introduction: Working
Group on the Future of Systemic Disparate Treatment Law, 32 Berk. J. of Emp. and Lab. L. 387
(2011).
12
See, e.g., John C. Coffee, “You Just Can’t Get There From Here”: A Primer on Wal Mart v.
Dukes, 80 U.S.L.W. 93 (July 19, 2011).
7
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actions to press a broad range of both systemic disparate treatment13 and
disparate impact claims.14
Unfortunately, in my view, the importance of the Wal Mart decision is also
limited for Title VII class actions, as it is for other kinds of class actions, by the
Court’s recent decisions in cases dealing with the arbitration of consumer
misrepresentation and antitrust claims rather than discrimination claims. Through
these decisions, including Concepcion and Italian Colors, the Roberts Court in
effect offered any business outside the transportation industry the option of
arbitration as a bar against collective actions brought by any economically
subordinate parties, including employees, upon whom the business can impose
agreements. These decisions, in tandem with the Court’s earlier application of the
FAA to employment contracts,15 empower most employers to preclude not only
class based litigation, but also class based arbitration.
This essay will proceed as follows. Part II traces the development of
Title VII class actions for both disparate treatment and disparate impact claims.
Part III examines the predictability and manageable impact of the primary holding
of the Wal Mart decision, its application of Rule 23(a)(2)’s conditioning of
certification on the existence of a common issue of fact or law. Part IV provides a
parallel assessment of the Court’s pronouncement on the limits of Rule 23 (b)(2)
class actions. While this assessment acknowledges the importance of the Court’s
pronouncements on (b)(2), including troublesome dicta limiting the use of
litigation models, the assessment concludes that these pronouncements do not
provide insurmountable barriers to Title VII class actions. Part V, however,
explains that such barriers have been erected by the Court’s more important
interpretations of the FAA.

13

See pages 4 7 infra.
See pages 7 8 infra.
15
See Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105 (2001); Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane
Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991); and pages 31 33 infra.
14
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II. The Satisfaction of Rule 23’s Commonality Condition for Title VII Class Action
Claims
Title VII does not include a provision for private collective actions.16 The
development of Title VII doctrine, however, soon made obvious how the
individual private actions contemplated by Title VII17 not only could be
permissively joined under Rule 20 of the FRCP,18 but also could be certified
appropriately as class actions under Rule 23. Rule 23 had been reformulated two
years after the passage of Title VII in part to clarify how courts could use class
actions to make litigation more efficient under certain conditions.19 Those
conditions, as stressed in Wal Mart, include a requirement for all types of plaintiff
class actions that there be some issue of fact or law that is common for a group of
claimants too numerous to be efficiently joined as named plaintiffs.20 Without
such commonality, there can be no efficiency gains in trying the claims together.
Soon after the passage of Title VII the Court structured two types of Title VII
private actions that often frame a salient common issue of fact for many litigants.
One type was modeled on the public civil action provision, § 707, which
empowers the Attorney General (now the EEOC)21 to bring actions against
employers for engaging in a “pattern or practice of resistance to the full
enjoyment of any of the rights secured” by Title VII and to seek injunctive relief to
restrain the practice.22 The “rights secured” by Title VII of course include the right

16

The Fair Labor Standards Act, which provides rights of action for both the Age Discrimination
in Employment Act and the Equal Pay Act, by contrast, does include a provision for an employee
or employees bringing actions “for and in behalf of himself or themselves and other employees
similarly situated” who opt into the action by giving “consent in writing.” 29 U.S.C. § 216(b).
17
See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e 5(f).
18
Fed. R. Civ. P. 20.
19
See Advisory Committee’s Notes, 28 U.S.C App. 695 697.
20
The conditions are that the class be “so numerous that joinder of all member is
impracticable,” tht there be “questions of law or fact common to the class,” that the “claims or
defenses of the representative parties are typical,” and that the “representative parties will
fairly and adequate protect the interests of the class.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a).
21
See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e 6(a), (e).
22
Id.

to be free of the unlawful discrimination prohibited by § 703.23 Further, the
unlawful discrimination for which the generally inanimate corporate employers in
our economy are responsible under § 703 include one or a group of their
authorized agents taking into account, with or without animus, one of Title VII’s
prohibited status categories in making a personnel decision or decisions that the
agents have authority to make for the employer.24 Thus, if private individuals
claim that they have been victimized by the same agent or agents because of the
same discriminatory bias, they may be presenting a common issue of fact for
litigation, the same predominant issue that would be presented in a public
“pattern or practice” case brought under § 707 – whether or not such a practice
or pattern existed for these agents.
By structuring pattern or practice litigation into two phases, moreover, the
Court made it even more potentially efficient and thus appropriate to employ a
private class action to attack a pattern or practice of intentional discrimination.
The Court contemplated a first phase of litigation to determine the existence vel
non of the pattern or practice and to consider general injunctive remedies, and
then a second phase to determine the identity of the actual victims and the
consequent relief available to individuals. The Court first suggested this division in
Franks v. Bowman,25 a decision reviewing and reversing the denial of retroactive
seniority relief to members of a certified class of blacks who had been denied
employment as over the road drivers by a company that had been determined to
have a general company wide pattern of discrimination against hiring blacks for
such positions.26 The Court held that absent special circumstances the lower
courts generally should grant class based retroactive seniority as an aspect of the
relief provided identifiable victims of illegal discrimination, but that the
identification of these victims would have to await further proceedings that
23

42 U.S.C. § 2000e 2(a).
Title VII defines the term “employer” to include “any agent.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b). The Court
has confirmed that this means employers are liable for the adverse “tangible” results of their
authorized agents’ discriminatory employment actions. See, e.g., Faragher v. City of Boca Raton,
524 U.S. 775 (1998); Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 70 71 (1986).
25
424 U.S. 747 (1976).
26
Id. at 750.
24

assume the finding of the general practice or pattern in the class action.27 The
Court significantly also explained that the finding of a pattern of discrimination in
the first phase would determine how the second phase would be conducted: “. . .
petitioners here have carried their burden of demonstrating the existence of a
discriminatory hiring pattern and practice by the respondents and, therefore, the
burden will be upon respondents to prove that individuals who reapply were not
in fact victims of previous hiring discrimination.”28
The Court formalized both this separation of pattern and practice litigation
into two phases and also the reversal of the burden of proof on to an employer
defendant in the second phase the following year in Teamsters v. United States,29
a § 707 public action brought against another trucking company and a union for a
similar company wide policy of discrimination against blacks in hiring for over
the rode trucking positions. The Court explained: “[A] court’s finding of a pattern
or practice justifies an award of prospective relief. . . . As was true of the
particular facts in Frank, and as is typical of Title VII pattern or practice suits, the
question of individual relief does not arise until it has been proved that the
employer has followed an employment policy of unlawful discrimination. The
force of that proof does not dissipate at the remedial stage of the trial. . . . As in
Franks, the burden then rests on the employer to demonstrate that the individual
applicant was denied an employment opportunity for lawful reasons.”30 Seven
years later the Court confirmed the applicability of Teamsters to private class
actions.31
27

Id. at 772.
Id.
29
431 U.S. 324 (1977).
30
Id. at 361.
31
“While a finding of a pattern or practice of discrimination itself justifies an award of
prospective relief to the class, additional proceedings are ordinarily required to determine the
scope of individual relief for the members of the class.” Cooper v. Federal Reserve Bank of
Richmond, 467 U.S. 867, 876 (1974) (holding that a finding of the absence of a pattern or
practice does not preclude individual claims of discrimination). See also id. at n. 9 (“Although
Teamsters involved an action litigated on the merits by the Government as plaintiff under §
707(a) of the Act, it is plain that the elements of a prima facie pattern or practice case are the
same in a private class action.”)
28

The use of the Teamsters two phase litigation structure for pattern and
practice cases in private class actions should not be surprising. The Teamsters
structure makes resolution of the common issue of whether agents of the
employer engaged in a pattern or practice of discrimination central to the entire
litigation. Every subsequent issue and the way it is to be resolved, including the
individual relief assigned to the second stage, turns on resolving this common
issue. The efficiency of resolving at one time the issue for all those potentially
affected by the alleged discriminatory pattern or practice is obvious.
The disparate impact cause of action provides the other doctrinal support
for Title VII class actions. In this cause of action, first formulated in the seminal
Griggs v. Duke Power32 case and later codified by the 1991 Act,33 a plaintiff can
establish illegal discrimination either (1) by demonstrating that a particular,
perhaps ostensibly neutral, practice of an employer has a disproportionate or
disparate impact on the employment opportunities of members of the plaintiff’s
Title VII defined status group – unless the employer can demonstrate the price is
“job related” and “consistent with business necessity”; or (2) even if the employer
can make the latter demonstration, by demonstrating an alternative practice, not
adopted by the employer, that could serve the employer’s business purpose
without such an impact.34 Like plaintiffs demonstrating a pattern or practice of
intentional discrimination, plaintiffs pressing a disparate impact claim can obtain
a prospective order to eliminate the practice by making one of these
demonstrations, but cannot obtain individual relief such as back pay and
instatement to a position denied them without further litigation to determine in
which cases the challenged practice actually caused the denial.35
This further remedial litigation in disparate impact cases, like the second
stage of pattern or practice litigation, thus turns on answering common questions
in a first stage. Under disparate impact doctrine potential liability to numerous
32

401 U.S. 424 (1971).
42 U.S.C. § 2000e 2(k).
34
Id.
35
Plaintiffs cannot recover compensatory or punitive damages for disparate impact claims. 42
U.S.C. § 1981A(a)(1).
33

members of a plaintiff’s Title VII defined status group will turn on common
answers to three questions – whether the ostensibly neutral practice has a
disparate impact on the plaintiff’s Title VII defined status group, whether the
practice is job related and consistent with business necessity, and whether an
effective alternative practice was not adopted. Answering these common
questions in one trial for all those potentially affected, like answering the central
common question in a pattern or practice case, obviously serves the efficiency
goal of Rule 23.
The centrality of common questions in both disparate impact and
intentional pattern or practice cases, however, does not mean that any Title VII
claim of a particular type of prohibited Title VII discrimination, such as race or sex
discrimination, shares common questions with all other possible claims of that
type of discrimination against the same employer. The Court rejected such an
“across the board rule” for certification of all employment discrimination classes
in General Telephone Co. of Southwest v. Falcon.36 The Falcon Court reminded
lower courts that since Title VII “contains no special authorization for class
suits,”37 an individual litigant must meet all the prerequisite conditions of Rule 23
for class certification, including commonality: “a Title VII class action, like any
other class action, may only be certified if the trial court is satisfied, after a
rigorous analysis, that the prerequisites of Rule 23(a) have been satisfied.”38
Furthermore, the Court noted this rigorous analysis sometimes may have “to
probe behind the pleadings.”39 The Court concluded that plaintiff Falcon’s case
should not have been certified because his “complaint provided an insufficient
basis for concluding that the adjudication of his claim of discrimination in
promotion would require the decision of any common question concerning the
failure to hire more Mexican Americans.”40 He did not, in other words, make
allegations to support a theory that any prohibited national origin discrimination
to which he was subjected by an agent of the employer defendant also affected
36

457 U.S. 147 (1982).
Id. at 156
38
Id. at 161.
39
Id. at 160.
40
Id. at 158.
37

decisions not to hire members of the class of Mexican Americans he sought to
represent. Predictably, the Court noted, the actual trial of Falcon’s individual
promotion discrimination and class hiring claims under different theories
provided no economy and “might as well have been tried separately.”41
III. The Wal Mart Court’s Holding on Commonality –
Given the above history, and especially the Falcon Court’s iteration that
courts should not certify Title VII class actions without rigorous analysis of the
satisfaction of Rule 23’s prerequisites, no one should have been surprised by the
Roberts Court’s refusal to sanction the certification of the Wal Mart class because
it failed to pose a common issue of law or fact for members of the requested
class. The lower courts in Wal Mart had approved the certification of a class of a
million and half current and former female employees of Wal Mart who alleged
sex based discrimination in their pay and promotions. Under settled and
uncontroversial law, Wal Mart as a corporate principal would be strictly liable for
any discriminatory pay or promotion decision made by any of its human agents
with the delegated authority to determine pay or promotion.42 This common
strict liability, however, did not present a common issue upon which to base
certification. Given the size and decentralized personnel operational structure of
Wal Mart, it was not possible for the plaintiffs to claim that the same group of
decision makers made all the allegedly discriminatory pay and promotion
decisions. Plaintiffs instead stressed that Wal Mart’s senior management
delegated discretion over pay and promotion to local managers. Proving a pattern
or practice of discrimination by some of these managers would not prove
discrimination by others or justify any burden shifting presumption of
discrimination in individual cases involving other managers. Thus, a theory of Wal
Mart disparate treatment liability based on settled and accepted agency law could
not present an issue capable of common resolution upon which to base
certification.

41
42

Id. at 159.
See note 24 and page 5 supra.

Plaintiffs’ attorneys had another theory upon which to base disparate
treatment liability that might present a common issue relevant to any and all
claims of discriminatory decisions by local managers. That theory, as
acknowledged by Justice Scalia in his majority opinion,43 was that Wal Mart
should be liable for its senior management’s awareness of and failure to respond
to the disproportionate exercise of local discretion in favor of men; in other
words, “its refusal to cabin its managers’ authority amounts to disparate
treatment.”44 Under this theory, the fault upon which Wal Mart’s liability is based
is not the fault of the various and varied local decision makers, but rather the
fault of the senior managers who are responsible for the entire company.
After acknowledging this theory in his statement of the case, Justice Scalia
failed to address it directly in his analysis of commonality. Instead, relying on
language from a footnote in Falcon,45 he simply asserted that demonstrating
commonality for certification of a companywide class of alleged discrimination
victims requires either isolating some “testing procedure or other companywide
evaluation system that can be charged with bias” or providing “significant proof”
that the “employer operated under a general policy of discrimination.”46 Justice
Scalia then explained that the Wal Mart plaintiffs met neither requirement. He
stressed that Wal Mart had a formal policy forbidding sex discrimination and
“imposes penalties [on managers] for denials of equal opportunity”;47 and he
asserted that the plaintiffs only evidence of a “general policy of discrimination”
was testimony from a sociologist who testified “that Wal Mart has a “strong
corporate culture” that makes it “vulnerable” to “gender bias”,” but who could
not calculate the level of discrimination that might result.48
Plaintiff lawyers might be disappointed by some of Justice Scalia’s language
and his quick treatment of the theory that Wal Mart’s liability should be based on
43

131 S. Ct. at 2548.
Id.
45
457 U.S. at 159 n. 15.
46
131 S. Ct. at 2553.
47
Id.
48
Id.
44

the failure of senior management to control discrimination by local managers,
rather than on the local managers’ acts of discrimination. The theory may seem a
promising way to achieve expanded, company wide certification. With the
approval of the Supreme Court,49 lower courts, borrowing from the common law
tort of negligent supervision,50 have consistently applied a negligence standard for
employer liability for co worker discriminatory harassment of other employees,51
where there would be no strict respondeat superior liability under agency law
because the harassment was outside the scope of employment.52 Demonstrating
senior management negligence is not necessary for company liability for
decisions, like those setting pay and promotions, within the scope of employment
and the authority of corporate managers, but it could establish commonality for
purposes of an expanded class certification.
The fact that Justice Scalia did not address this potential basis for
commonality ultimately should not be surprising, however. First, the plaintiffs’
attorneys in Wal Mart did not, and on the facts of the case, could not forcefully
advance a negligence based theory of company liability on which to base
commonality. Negligence based company liability for discriminatory harassment
requires only supervisory agents’ knowledge or constructive knowledge of and
failure to control co worker discriminatory harassment. Unlike harassment,
however, authorized personnel decisions, like those governing promotions and
pay, are not ostensibly problematic. Negligence based liability for ostensibly
appropriate decisions would require knowledge or constructive knowledge not
only of the decisions, but also of a discriminatory motivation underlying the
decisions. In Wal Mart, no strong evidence of senior management knowledge of
widespread discriminatory motivation was advanced.53
49

See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 799 800 (1998).
See Restatement of the Law, Employment Law § 4.04.
51
See, e.g., Crowley v. L.L. Bean, Inc., 303 F.3d 387, 401 (1st Cir. 2002); EEOC v. Hacienda Hotel,
881 F.2d 1504, 1516 (9th Cir. 1989).
52
See Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 758 (1998) (“general rule is that sexual
harassment by a superior is not considered within the scope of employment”).
53
The plaintiffs did not offer sufficient evidence even to impel Justice Scalia to respond to a
theory of senior management negligence. Justice Scalia considered and dismissed plaintiffs’
50

Plaintiffs’ attorneys might hope that senior managers should be assigned
constructive knowledge of their subordinates’ discriminatory motivation based on
general statistics of the sort presented by the Wal Mart plaintiffs’ experts. These
statistics showed that females generally had fared worse in pay and promotions
throughout the company.54 An assignment of constructive knowledge of
discrimination based on such statistics, however, effectively would entail making
companies vulnerable to judicial control of their personnel policies whenever
their senior management failed to secure proportional success for every Title VII
defined status group. Hoping for the pronouncement of such law from a
conservative Court that disfavors anything that would encourage “quotas”55
certainly seems chimerical.56 If senior management negligence is to be a basis for
commonality in future attempts to secure companywide certification, it will have
to be through evidence of senior management indifference to known pervasive
discriminatory motivation, not simply to known disproportionate statistics.
Furthermore, unlike establishing liability through the demonstration of a
company wide policy of discrimination, establishing company liability based on
senior management indifference to known discriminatory delegated decision
making by subordinate managers, would not necessarily justify a presumption of
discrimination by all subordinate managers. It is not clear therefore that
resolution of the issue of senior management negligence advances any claims for
individual relief for past discrimination. Claimants for individual relief still would
company wide and region wide statistics and anecdotal evidence of discrimination only as
proof of a company wide policy of discrimination, not as proof of senior management
knowledge of pervasive discrimination by many junior managers. 131 S. Ct. at 2555 2557.
54
Id. at 2555.
55
See, e.g., Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 561 (2009) (employer violates Title VII when it
changes an employment practice in order to remedy disproportionate impact of prior practice
in absence of strong basis of evidence that prior practice was illegal discrimination).
56
Aside from this political realism, Michael Selmi has argued that holding employers liable for
imbalances in their work forces solely because senior management is aware of those
imbalances could result in more tolerated discrimination because it would discourage
employers from collecting information that might lead to such awareness. See Michael Selmi,
Theorizing Systemic Disparate Treatment Law, 32 Berk. J. of Emp. and Lab. L. 477, 504 (2011).
Assuming different political realities, and a different Supreme Court, however, the law could
impose affirmative obligations on employers to study and remedy unjustified imbalances.

have the burden of proving they were victims of a particular subordinate
manager’s discrimination even after proving senior management’s negligence.
The latter proof would justify only company wide prospective remedies and thus
perhaps only certification of a class seeking such remedies.57
The Wal Mart plaintiffs’ strongest case for commonality was based not on
their disparate treatment pattern or practice claim, but rather on their claim that
Wal Mart’s delegation to local managers of authority over pay and promotions
had a disparate impact on female employees. This delegation was a central policy
of the company that affected all members of the class for which certification was
sought. Like any disparate impact claim, it thus seemed to present the common
issues of impact and justification.58 Moreover, in 1988 the Court had held in
Watson v. Fort Worth Bank and Trust,59 a case involving a bank’s delegation of
personnel discretion to supervisors, that disparate impact analysis could be
applied to “subjective employment criteria.”60
Apart from providing a possible common issue for certification, using
disparate impact analysis to challenge a company’s system of delegated
discretion, rather than some subjective criteria or other factor guiding that
discretion, seemed odd and unpromising, however. The same statistics that
would demonstrate a disproportionate impact from a general system of unguided
delegation on a plaintiff’s Title VII defined status group would also demonstrate
that the company was pervaded with discriminating decision makers. The
delegation of personnel discretion will result in a discriminatory effect only if the
delegees are exercising that discretion with discriminatory intent. Furthermore,
proof of only a discriminatory impact, as opposed to proof of a discriminatory
intent, can be rebutted by a business justification, which is not hard for any
business to identify for its delegation of discretion to supervisors.

57

See page 18 infra.
See pages 7 8 supra.
59
487 U.S. 977 (1988).
60
Id. at 990.
58

Given that a disparate impact challenge to the unguided delegation of
discretion, like a systemic disparate treatment challenge, ultimately can be
successful only by proving that some of the delegees were intentionally
discriminating, it is not surprising that Justice Scalia applied the same
commonality analysis to both. Neither challenge turns on a common issue
because each ultimately requires a determination of how discretion is exercised
by individual delegees: “demonstrating the invalidity of one manager’s use of
discretion will do nothing to demonstrate the invalidity of another’s.”61 For
certification of a company wide class in either type of challenge then, plaintiffs
must “identify a common mode of exercising discretion that pervades the entire
company.”62 Justice Scalia, quoting language from Justice O’Connor’s opinion in
Watson, suggested that this will only be possible for a disparate impact challenge
that identifies “a specific employment practice,” whether or not subjective, that is
to guide the discretion of all the company’s decision makers.63
Justice Scalia’s interpretation of Watson to prevent its use as a basis for
commonality for a class like that sought in Wal Mart may or may not have
retracted its problematic application64 to unguided delegations. It clearly did not,
however, preclude finding commonality in disparate impact challenges to a range
of subjective policies. As long as the policy is to be applied by those making or
affecting the personnel decisions challenged by all members of the class, there is
the potential for commonality. That potential might be negated in challenges to
subjective policies, as in challenges to objective policies, where plaintiffs cannot
demonstrate that any disparate impact from the policy is likely to pervade the
class. For most challenges to subjective policies – as for challenges to objective
standards that confine, rather than just expand managerial discretion, however,
the commonality criterion for certification of a class affected by multiple
supervisors or other decision makers should not block certification.

61

131 S. Ct. at 2554.
Id. at 2554 2555.
63
Id. at 2555, quoting 487 U.S. at 994.
64
See page 13 supra.
62

This has already been demonstrated in lower court decisions since Wal
Mart. For instance, in McReynolds v. Merrill Lynch,65 Judge Posner for a
unanimous panel reversed a district court’s pre Wal Mart denial of certification of
a class of seven hundred black brokers, currently or formerly employed by Merrill
Lynch, who claimed a racial impact deriving from two company policies that
framed the discretion of district and branch managers over decisions affecting
pay. Judge Posner distinguished the challenge to these policies from the challenge
to Wal Mart’s delegation of unconfined discretion by stressing that the policies –
allowing brokers to form their own account teams and distributing accounts on
the basis of past performance affected by the teams – “are practices of Merrill
Lynch, rather than practices that local managers can choose or not . . . .”66
Similarly, in Ellis v. Costco Wholesale Corp.,67 on remand from the Court of
Appeals for reconsideration after Wal Mart, a district court held that the
commonality requirement could be satisfied for a class of current and former
female employees who were denied managerial promotions at Costco because
the plaintiff had identified specific companywide employment practices within
Costco’s promotion system.68 While some of these practices – such as the non
posting of open positions and reliance on promotable lists of desired candidates
presumably would have a disparate impact on women only if combined with
conscious or unconscious discriminatory intent,69 the plaintiffs also presented
evidence of the involvement of high level central management throughout the

65

672 F.3d 482 (7th Cir. 2012).
Id. at 490.
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285 F.R.D. 492 (N.D. Cal. 2012).
68
See id. at 531.
69
To the extent that central policies only cause discrimination by enabling lower level managers
to discriminate, such policies are no different than the policy of full delegation rejected as a
basis for commonality in Wal Mart. Some of the Costco policies, such as “placing a premium on
schedule flexibility and ability to relocate,” id., could have a disparate impact in the absence of
discriminatory intent, however. Cf. Dukes v. Wal Mart Stores, Inc., 964 F.Supp.2d 1115, 1127
(N.D. Cal. 2014) (leaving managers “without meaningful guidance in applying … impossibly
vague criteria” does not present common question because discrimination will turn on how
discretion is exercised by various managers).
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promotion process to bolster their commonality case for their disparate impact as
well as their systemic disparate treatment challenge.70
Since Wal Mart courts like that in Ellis71 also have held the commonality
requirement can be satisfied for employer or companywide classes asserting
systemic disparate treatment claims where the alleged degree of involvement of
central management in the allegedly discriminatory decisions made plausible that
every member of the class could have been affected by the same discriminatory
intent.72 The Wal Mart Court’s holding on commonality has been the basis for
70

See also, e.g., Scott v. Family Dollar Stores, Inc., 733 F.3d 105, 116 117 (4th Cir. 2013) (finding
amended complaint made sufficient allegation of potential disparate impact from common
companywide policies affecting the entire class); Chen Oster v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., 877
F.Supp.2d 113, 118 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (declining to strike class allegations in complaint because
complaint identifies a number of specific companywide employment practices and “testing
procedures,” including a co employee review process and quartile ranking system); Calibuso v.
Bank of America Corp., 893 F.Supp.2d 374, 376 (E.D.N.Y. 2012) (on motion to dismiss based on
complaint, distinguishing Wal Mart because of allegations of companywide policies that
“systematically favor[] male[s]]”
Courts also have continued to recognize the common issues for class certification
presented in cases challenging objective employment practices such as scored aptitude tests or
physical requirements. See, e.g., Gulino v. Bd. of Educ. of City Sch. Dist. of New York, 907 F.
Supp. 2d 492 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (commonality existed in the alleged disparate impact of
standardized tests); cf. Easterling v. Conn. Dept. of Corrections, 278 F.R.D. 41 (D.Conn. 2011)
(declining to decertify class after resolution of common issue that a required timed 1.5 run had
a disparate impact on female applicants for employment); cf. Stockwell v. City & County of San
Francisco, 749 F.3d 1107 (9th Cir. 2014) (change in promotional examination alleged to have
disparate impact on the basis of age in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act).
71
See 285 F.R.D. at 511 (finding the plaintiffs’ disparate treatment claims to present a common
issue because of the involvement of central high level management in all promotion decisions).
72
See, e.g., Kassman v. KPMG LLP, 925 F.Supp.2d 453 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (plaintiff’s complaint
alleged companywide policies and practices originating in New York headquarters, including a
policy of automatically demoting women, but not men, who transfer from an international
office); Parra v. Bashas’, Inc., 291 F.R.D. 360, 373 376 (D. Ariz. 2012) (finding commonality
satisfied by allegation of two tier pay disparity between two different jointly owned store
chains to which plaintiffs were discriminatorily assigned); Johnson v. Flakeboard America Ltd.,
2012 WL 2237004,*5 (D.S.C. 2012) (allegation of racially hostile work environment perpetrated
and tolerated by same group of decision makers in two small plants in one small town). Cf.
Cronas v. Willis Group Holding, Ltd., 2011 WL 5007976*3 (Oct. 18, 2011) (approving a
settlement class in part because “the delegation policy [the class] challenge[s] has subjected
them all to discrimination at the hands of the same regional officers”).

courts denying class certification only in cases where all members of the putative
Title VII class have not allegedly been affected by the discriminatory actions of the
same decision makers.73 One good example is the futile attempt of the Wal Mart
lawyers to obtain certification of a smaller class defined by Wal Mart’s California
regions, rather than by the local managers to whom discretion to make the
challenged personnel decisions had been delegated.74 The Wal Mart lawyers
failed to identify “a core group of biased upper level managers who influenced all
of the challenged decisions by lower level managers.”75 This ultimately is the
unsurprising lesson iterated by the Supreme Court in Wal Mart: Class litigation is
appropriate only where it will be more efficient because each member of the
requested class has a potential Title VII claim that turns on resolution of a
common issue, either the existence of discriminatory intent, whether conscious or
unconscious, from the same decision makers, or the unjustified disparate impact
of a specific employment practice applied to all members of the class.
IV. The Wal Mart Court’s Pronouncement on Rule 23(b)(2)
Satisfaction of the commonality standard and of the three other conditions
set forth in Rule 23(a) of course is not sufficient for certification. Plaintiffs also
must fit a requested class into one of the three categories specified in Rule 23(b).
Interpreting the second of these specifications, (b)(2), the Court’s opinion in Wal
Mart offered, with the support of every Justice, an alternative reason why the
certification of the class could not stand. Although this interpretation poses a
greater threat to the certification of Title VII class actions than does the Court’s
73

See, e.g., Davis v. Cintas Corp., 717 F.3d 476, 487 89 (6th Cir. 2013) (upholding finding of no
commonality where “thousands of managers at hundreds of facilities” made challenged hiring
decisions); Tabor v. Hilti Inc. 703 F.3d 1206, 1229 (10th Cir. 2013) (no common mode of
exercising discretion that pervades the entire company); Bolden v. Walsh Const. Co., 688 F.3d
893, 896 (7th Cir. 2012) (reversing certification because claim challenged no companywide
policy, only exercise of discretion of various supervisors at 262 construction work sites);
Bennett v. Nucor Corp., 656 F.3d 802, 808 (8th Cir. 2011) (affirming denial of certification of
class of employees in all departments because of delegation of discretion to departmental
managers).
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See Dukes v. Wal Mart Stores, Inc., 964 F.Supp.2d 1115 (N.D. Cal. 2013).
75
Id. at 1122. See also Ladik v. Wal Mart Stores, Inc., 291 F.R.D. 263, 270 (W.D. Wis. 2013)
(plaintiffs did not explain how decisions of various managers in region are linked).

holding on commonality, it need not present an insurmountable barrier to the
efficient and effective class litigation of meritorious Title VII claims.
Rule 23(b)(2) allows certifications where “the party opposing the class has
acted or refused to act on grounds that apply generally to the class, so that final
injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief is appropriate respecting the
class as a whole.”76 The rule drafters in 1966 intended this provision to support
civil rights actions seeking prospective injunctive and declaratory relief77 and it
certainly fits Title VII actions seeking to declare illegal and enjoin some
discriminatory practice or policy of an employer, as the modification of such a
practice or policy could affect the interests of many employees. Some lower
courts, however, also had employed (b)(2) as a basis for certification of Title VII
classes seeking individual monetary relief, especially the “equitable restitution” of
back pay, in addition to prospective injunctions.78 The Court in Wal Mart rejected
this use of (b)(2), unanimously pronouncing that any claim for monetary relief,
including a Title VII claim for backpay, that “is not incidental to the injunctive or
declaratory relief” cannot be certified for class adjudication under Rule 23(b)(2).79
The Court’s interpretation of (b)(2) is significant for Title VII class actions
because it requires such actions to proceed under the more stringent
requirements of (b)(3).80 These requirements include notification to all class
members of the nature of the action and their right to be excluded from the class
if they so choose.81 The notice requirement discourages class actions because it
imposes on plaintiffs’ attorneys costs that generally can be recouped only through
settlement or a favorable judgment.
76

Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 23(b)(2).
See Advisory Committee’s Notes, 39 F.R.D. 69, 102 (1966).
78
See, e.g., Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791 (4th Cir. 1971); Bowe v. Colgate Palmolive
Co., 416 F.2d 711 (7th Cir. 1969).
79
131 S. Ct. at 2557.
80
There have been no Title VII class actions certified or persuasively proposed under Rule
23(b)(1), as the provisions of this subsection are framed to cover limited situations where
proceeding through individual adjudications could result in incompatible orders to the party
opposing the class or prejudice to other class members. See Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 23(b)(1).
81
Rule 23(b)(1) and (b)(2) class actions, unlike (b)(3) actions, are mandatory; class members
have no right to withdraw from the class.
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More significantly, the requirements also include obtaining findings from
the court “that the questions of law or fact common to class members
predominate over any question affecting only individual members, and that a
class action is superior to other available methods for fairly and efficiently
adjudicating the controversy.”82 Rule 23(b)(3) further states that these findings
must take into account, inter alia, “the likely difficulties managing a class
action.”83 These requirements of predominance and superiority may be difficult to
meet for Title VII class actions, like Wal Mart, seeking monetary relief for
individual class members, because such relief only can be granted after a second
stage of litigation to determine which members of the class have been adversely
affected by a defendant’s policy or practice of discrimination and to what extent.
A defendant opposing certification therefore can argue – especially for a
particularly numerous class, like that proposed in Wal Mart that the many
questions governing individual claims predominate over the common issue of the
existence of the practice or policy of discrimination and that the difficulty of
managing so many claims in one court prevents the class action from being a
superior means of adjudication.84
The Wal Mart Court’s explanation of why the back pay relief sought by the
plaintiffs could not qualify as “incidental” to their requested injunctive and
declaratory relief includes particularly troublesome dicta that seems to reject the
most direct way of dealing with this manageability problem. The Wal Mart
plaintiffs had argued that back pay should be treated as incidental for purpose of
(b)(2) certification in part because the Court of Appeals had approved a remedial
82

Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 23(b)(3).
Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 23(b)(3)((D),
84
The availability of such an argument against certification of a (b)(3) class indeed means that
the Court’s unanimous strict interpretation of (b)(2) renders almost non consequential the Wal
Mart Court’s strict interpretation of the (a)(2) commonality requirement; the Wal Mart
majority could have upheld a denial of certification under subsection (b) even if it had assumed
all of the subsection (a) conditions, including commonality, were met. Justice Ginsberg’s dissent
from the Court’s interpretation of (a)(2), while concurring in its interpretation in its
interpretation of (b)(2), 131 S. Ct. 2561, thus carries little force. In effect, she can charge only
that “the Court imports into the Rule 23(a) determination concerns properly addressed in a
Rule 23(b)(3) assessment.” Id. at 2562.
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trial stage to determine a percentage of valid claims through depositions relevant
to a representative sample set of the claimant class. That percentage would have
been multiplied by the total number of members in the class and the average
back pay award in the sample set to determine a total back pay recovery to be
distributed equally to all members of the class, after a reduction of attorneys’ fees
of course. By rejecting this “Trial by Formula”85 as a modification of the two phase
trial established in Teamsters and a denial of Wal Mart’s entitlement “to
individualized determinations of backpay,”86 Justice Scalia suggested that the
Teamsters system also could not be modified for the purposes of making a (b)(3)
class more manageable.
Although Justice Scalia’s “Trial by Formula” dicta is particularly troublesome
and open to challenge,87 the Court’s unanimous interpretation of (b)(2) should
not have been more surprising than its divided interpretation of (a)(2). The
structure of Rule 23 draws a clear line between relief that must be provided in the
aggregate and individual relief that only may be aggregated where it is efficient to
do so.88 As Justice Scalia explained, where the only relief sought is injunctive or
declaratory “respecting the class as a whole,” there is no need for a court before
certification to consider predominance or superiority or to require notification of
an opportunity to withdraw from the class.89 “Predominance and superiority are
self evident” because all issues are common for all appropriate members of the
requested class.90 Notification is not necessary for a “mandatory” (b)(2) class
because individual class members are not allowed to withdraw from litigation
that will efficiently settle the same issues for all class members without resolution
of any distinct claims of individuals that they may wish to litigate separately. If
representatives of a putative class seek any form of individual monetary relief,
85

Id. at 2561.
Id. at 2560.
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For a compelling critique, see Melissa Hart, Civil Rights and Systemic Wrongs, Berk. J. of Emp.
and Lab. Law, 455, 464 468 (2011).
88
As Justice Scalia also stressed, 131 S. Ct. at 2557 2558, the history of the Rule’s development
and interpretation highlights the same line.
89
Id. at 2558.
90
Id.
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this analysis does not apply; the separate issues posed by the individual claims
require consideration of predominance and superiority, and even if those
separate issues can be managed easily, individuals with special claims are due the
opportunity to elect to litigate them separately.91
The Court’s unanimous interpretation of (b)(2) thus is both a barrier to easy
certification of Title VII class actions and unlikely to be reversed. It does not,
however, present an insurmountable barrier. Even though Justice Scalia’s “Trial by
Formula” dicta restricts courts’ ability to make (b)(3) classes more manageable,
the Court’s (b)(2) analysis does not, contrary to Professor Coffee,92 sound the
death knell for Title VII class actions.
First, it should not be gainsaid that the Court’s interpretation does not
obstruct the use of (b)(2) classes to enjoin the continuation of discriminatory
practices or policies. The elimination of future discrimination is the primary
purpose of the statute. Prospective injunctions may include the imposition of
somewhat burdensome monitoring requirements on employers. If a court
recognizes a cause of action for a company’s senior management’s negligent
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This analysis strongly suggests that no individualized monetary relief can be sought by a (b)(2)
class regardless of whether awarding the relief would “introduce new substantial legal or
factual issues, []or entail complex individualized determinations.” Allison v. Citgo Petroleum
Corp., 151 F.3d 402, 415 (5th Cir. 1998), quoted in Wal Mart, at 2560. Justice Scalia quotes this
test, without endorsing it, to demonstrate that plaintiffs could not meet it, including through
use of the “Trial by Formula” he rejects even if it applied. Id. at 2561. His general analysis of the
structure of Rule 23, however, indicates that (b)(2) classes can seek no individual monetary
relief, regardless of how easily such relief could be calculated, as some class members might
want to have the opportunity to litigate their own claims, and such individual litigation, in
contrast to seeking an injunction covering the whole class, would be feasible. It seems likely
that the Court would hold that the only permissible monetary relief available to a (b)(2) class
not given the opportunity to opt out would be aggregate monetary relief such as a fund for a
training program or for a monitoring system to prevent further discrimination. But see, e.g.,
Johnson v. Meritor Health Services Employment Retirement Plan, 702 F.3d 364, 372 (7th Cir.
2012) (“Should it appear that the calculation of monetary relief will be mechanical, formulaic, a
task not for a trier of fact but for a computer program, … the district court can award that relief
without … converting this (b)(2) action to a (b)(3) action.”)
92
See John C. Coffee, “You Just Can’t Get There From Here”: A Primer on Wal Mart v. Dukes, 80
U.S.L.W. 93 (July 19, 2011).

control of discriminating supervisors,93 moreover, the court might issue a
particularly restrictive injunction. While courts may enjoin discriminatory
practices in private disparate impact cases without class certification, the courts
of appeals uniformly have held that private pattern or practice cases only can
proceed as class actions.94
Admittedly, for employers weighing settlement the threat of a court order
imposing only prospective injunctive relief is not comparable to the threat of
significant monetary damages. Therefore, bringing an action for only prospective
injunctive relief is not as attractive to lawyers seeking a settlement fund from
which to draw attorneys’ fees exceeding the hourly fees made available to
prevailing parties under Title VII’s attorneys’ fees provision.95 Lawyers will
hesitate to bear the risks of losing any complicated pattern or practice case if they
cannot compensate for those risks with the expectation of a bonus if they are
successful. Furthermore, the threat of monetary damages may be more effective
than prospective injunctions in eliminating the continuation of future
discrimination.
The Wal Mart decision, however, neither precludes successful (b)(2) class
actions for prospective injunctive relief being the basis for successful individual
actions for monetary relief, nor prevents the lawyers bringing such (b)(2) actions
from profiting from the subsequent actions. The Wal Mart decision, as noted,96
expressly endorses the two phase Teamsters litigation system, and the decision
does not suggest that the presumption of liability to all class members established
by a finding of a general practice of discrimination in the first phase would not
carry over into the second phase where that second phase was conducted
through individual actions. At the least, preclusion law could benefit the members
of a prevailing class; the employer could be collaterally estopped from denying
93

See pages 10 11 supra.
See Chin v. Port Authority of New York, 685 F.3f 135, 149 150 (2d Cir. 2012) (and cases cited
therein).
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See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e 5(k). The Supreme Court has adopted the “lodestar” or hourly rate
method of calculating attorneys’ fees for civil rights cases. See, e.g., Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461
U.S. 424 (1986).
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See page 20 supra.
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the general discriminatory practice in subsequent individual actions brought by
class members.97 The lawyers representing the (b)(2) class could expect to bring
some of the individual actions, filing jointly in many cases. The class action
lawyers also could expect to reap some financial gains from the referral of other
cases.98
Judge Posner explained how certification of a 700 member (b)(2) class was
appropriate in the McReynolds99 case not only to determine whether Merrill
Lynch’s allegedly discriminatory practices should be enjoined, but also to
determine the issue of the illegality of the practices for simplification of the
resolution of individual claims for pecuniary relief.100 After noting that the stakes
in the individual brokers’ claims would “make individual suits feasible,” Judge
Posner observed that without a prior class wide determination of legality of the
practices, “the lawsuits will be more complex if, until issue or claim preclusion
sets in, the question whether Merrill Lynch has violated the antidiscrimination
statutes must be determined anew in each case.”101
Judge Posner was not troubled by the prospect of the employer asserting
claim preclusion in subsequent individual actions for monetary relief. Other courts
97

Cf. Parklane Hosiery Company v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322 (1979) (plaintiffs may assert even non
mutual collateral estoppel in legal action based on prior equitable action not tried to a jury). Of
course, if the employer successfully defended against the (b)(2) class’s claim of a general
discriminatory practice, the employer would be able to assert collateral estoppel against any
individual claimant that attempted to reassert such a practice. But individual claimants could
still assert individual instances of discrimination. See Cooper v. Federal Reserve Bank, 467 U.S.
876, 880 (1984).
98
The injunctive relief indeed could include a requirement that the employer notify class
members of the employer’s possible liability to them because of its general discriminatory
practices.
99
See page 15 and note 65 supra.
100
672 F.3d at 492.
101
Id. Judge Posner also invoked Rule 23(c)(4) to certify the class to resolve the general legality
of the challenged practices for any subsequent claims for pecuniary relief. Id. This apparent
invocation of (c)(4) to justify a certification beyond those permitted by the three categories in
23(b) was problematic. See page 24 infra. It was also unnecessary, however, because
determining whether the practices should be enjoined for the (b)(2) class required resolution of
the issues of general legality, and that resolution would have the same effect on actions for
monetary relief without any further class certification.

of appeals have recognized “that a class action suit seeking only declaratory and
injunctive relief does not bar subsequent individual damage action claims,” even
though claim preclusion would defeat the damage action had the first action been
an individual suit.102 This recognition must be correct at least for class actions for
injunctive relief that could not add claims for individual monetary either through
(b)(2) class certification or through a (b)(3) class certification. Claim preclusion is
not appropriately asserted against claims that could not have been asserted in the
earlier action.103
To be sure, the filing of many potential Title VII class actions would be
discouraged if plaintiffs’ lawyers cannot obtain certification of a class that can
seek or at least settle claims for monetary damages. Many individual employment
discrimination claims do not offer the potential pecuniary recovery of the Merrill
Lynch broker claims considered by Judge Posner and thus would have no positive
value for class action lawyers without aggregation in a numerous class. In cases
featuring such claims, plaintiff attorneys probably must have some control over
the monetary claims of class members for negotiation of a settlement fund from
which to recover fees and costs.
Since the Wal Mart decision, however, numerous courts have held that
(b)(3) Title VII plaintiffs’ classes can be certified. Some courts have continued to
102

See, e.g., Hiser v. Franklin, 94 F.3d 1287, 1291 (9th Cir. 1996)(“every federal court of appeals
that has considered the question has held that a class action seeking only declaratory or
injunctive relief does not bar subsequent individual suits for damages”). See also Gooch v. Life
Investors Inc. Co. of Am., 672 F.3d 402, 428 n. 16 (6th Cir. 1996); Wright, Miller, Cooper, 18A
Fed. Prac. & Proc. Juris. § 4455 (2d ed.) (“an individual who has suffered particular injury as a
result of practices enjoined in a class action should remain free to seek a damage remedy even
though claim preclusion would defeat a second action had the first action been an individual
suit for the same injunctive relief”).
103
In his analysis of the scope of (b)(2), Justice Scalia does state in Wal Mart that a member of a
class that had unsuccessfully sought back pay “might be collaterally estopped from
independently seeking compensatory damages based” on the same allegedly discriminatory
employment decision. 131 S. Ct. at 2559. This, however, only confirms that members of a
plaintiff class who lose on a litigated issue are estopped from relitigating that issue against the
defendant in a subsequent action. This dicta has no relevance to the availability of claim
preclusion against members of a plaintiffs’ class that was successful on related claims in the
prior action.

endorse the practice, approved by some courts of appeals and not rejected in
Wal Mart, of certifying a mandatory (b)(2) class to consider injunctive relief and
an opt out (b)(3) class to consider individual monetary relief.104 Although some of
these decisions may take too sanguine a view of the manageability of individual
claims for monetary relief,105 all can be justified by an appropriate reading of Rule
23 that is consistent with Wal Mart. The (b)(3) certifications seem least
problematic for claims for which no jury is requested, including disparate impact
claims for which Title VII provides no right to legal damages or a jury trial;106 such
cases provide the option of using magistrates to determine which class members
do not deserve back pay because of the employer defenses recognized in
Teamsters.107 In some cases, moreover, it might be possible to calculate back pay
on an aggregate basis without modifying the substantive law through a “Trial by
Formula” as rejected by Justice Scalia in Wal Mart.108 Yet even the (b)(3)
certifications of large Title VII classes seeking legal damages for intentional
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See, e.g., Gulino v. Bd. of Educ. of City Sch. Dist. of city of New York, 907 F.Supp.2d 492
(S.D.N.Y. 2012); United States v. City of New York, 276 F.R.D. 22 (E.D. N.Y. 2011); Easterling v.
Conn. Dep’t of Correction, 278 F.R.D. 41 (D. Conn. 2011); Johnson v. Flakeboard America Ltd.,
2012 WL 2237004 (D.S.C. 2012); Ellis v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 285 F.R.D. 492, 535 544 (N.D.
Cal. 2012).
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See, e.g., Ellis v. Costco, supra, at 540 (finding claims for individual relief from 700 member
class manageable).
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See 42 U.S.C. § 1981A(a)(1) (no damage relief in disparate impact cases) and (c) (right to jury
trial available only where complaining party seeks damages).
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See page 6 supra.
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For instance, in Easterling, supra note xx, the court concluded that the number of women
excluded by an unjustified physical test could be determined by a comparison of a prior period
during which the test was not used. 278 F.R.D. at 50 n.6. The Easterling court also noted that
determining which women would have been hired but for the test “would be impossible”
because the test was used as a screening device early in the hiring period. Id. at 48 49. The
court concluded that individual issues such as current qualifications and individual mitigation
efforts could be treated without making the class unmanageable. Id. at 50. See also City of New
York, supra note xx, at (in challenge to discriminatory written examinations, “[b]ecause it is
impossible to determine exactly which non hire victims would have received job offers and
which delayed hire victims would have been hired in the absence of discrimination, the court
must first determine the aggregate amount of individual relief to which the subclasses are
entitled and then distribute that relief pro rata to eligible claimants.”).

discrimination can be justified by use of the authority provided district judges by
Rule 23(c)(4).109
Rule 23(c)(4) provides that “[w]hen appropriate, an action may be brought
or maintained as a class action with respect to particular issues.”110 This does not
provide an additional category to supplement the three alternative types of class
actions listed in Rule 23(b);111 certification requires meeting the requirements of
one of the three parts of Rule 23(b). Rule 23(c)(4), however, allows courts to
consider whether the requirements of Rule 23(b) would be met if the cause of
action were bifurcated by issues, only some of which would be litigated for the
entire class.112 Contrary to the claims of management attorneys who would like to
extract the (c)(4) provision from Rule 23,113 this unambiguous and generally
accepted meaning of (c)(4)114 does not obviate the predominance and superiority
requirements of (b)(3).115 If (c)(4) is employed to sever certain issues for class
109

For invocation of this authority in recent Title VII decisions considering hybrid certifications,
see, e.g., Costco, supra, at 544; Gulino, supra, at 507; McReynolds, supra, at 490; City of New
York, supra, at 33.
110
Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 23 (c)(4).
111
Rule 23(c) provides supplementary rules and tools for courts; it does not add to the three
class action categories set forth in (b). One of the tools, (c)(4), is to maintain a class action “with
respect to particular issues.” Such an issue class has to meet the three requirements of one of
the parts of subsection (b). See Laura Hines, Challenging the Issue Class Action End Run, 52
Emory L. J. 709, 752 759 (2003) (1966 advisory committee that drafted the issue class provision
intended it be used to complement not supplant the Rule 23(b) categories).
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See, e.g., McReynolds v. Merrill Lynch & Co., 672 F.3d 482 (7th Cir. 2012); In re Nassau Cnty.
Strip Search Cases, 461 F.3d 219 (2d Cir. 2006); Valentino v. Carter Wallace, Inc., 97 F.3d 1227
(9th Cir. 1996). See generally Joseph Seiner, The Issue Class, 56 B.C. L. Rev. xxx (2015).
113
See, e.g., Robert Rachal, Page Griffin & Madeline Chimento Rea, Labor and Employment and
ERISA Class Actions After Wal Mart and Comcast – Practice Points for Defendants (Part II Rule
23(b)), 41 Emp. Dis. Rep. 862, 863 65 (Dec. 11, 2013).
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See, e.g., Manual for Complex Litigation (Fourth) § 21.25, 273 (2004) (Rule 23(c)(4)
authorizes a court to “achieve the economics of class action treatment for a portion of a case,
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action”); see also Charles Alan Wright, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1790 (3d ed. 2014); 2
William B. Rubenstein, Newberg on Class Actions § 4:89 (5th ed. 2013).
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In Castano v. American Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734, 745 n.21 (5th Cir. 1996), the Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit seemed to endorse the view that (c)(4) cannot be used to sever
issues to achieve predominance: “Reading Rule 23(c)(4) as allowing a court to sever issues until

treatment, the predominance and superiority requirements still must be applied
to determine whether class treatment of just those issues will serve the efficiency
goal of Rule 23. In some cases, class litigation of a common, but peripheral issue
that is not antecedent to separate individual issues, rather than of an antecedent
pivotal issue that could dispose of all individual claims, will not be efficient. Class
litigation of a peripheral, non pivotal issue may be wasted litigation if more
complicated individual actions involving the same facts must follow before relief
can be granted or denied. Similarly, severance of a common issue of fact or law
does not necessarily render class litigation of that issue and individual litigation of
other issues a superior method of adjudication. Severance may make the
litigation of the common issue manageable, but the other “matters pertinent” to
superiority listed in (b)(3) may weigh in favor of separate actions.116 Other
litigation already may have begun and the variance in the value of claims may
indicate that class members should control the prosecution of all their particular
cases, including the common issue.
In the typical Title VII disparate impact or disparate treatment pattern or
practice case, however, the issue of whether challenged employment practices or
decision making processes are discriminatory and illegal is almost always the
central predominant issue upon which individual actions for monetary relief must
hinge. Deciding that issue collectively rather than in individual actions almost
always will be more efficient and fairer than deciding it multiple times and in

the remaining common issue predominates over the remaining individual issues would
eviscerate the predominance requirement of Rule 23(b)(3); the result would be automatic
certification in every case where there is a common issue, a result that could not have been
intended.” In Castano, a national mass tort class action against the cigarette companies seeking
compensation for nicotine addiction, variations in governing state law rendered predominance
questionable even after severance. Subsequent decisions of this court, however, have found
predominance where particular issues can be decided together and would be pivotal to all
cases. See, e.g., Mullen v. Treasure Chest Casino, LLC, 186 F.3d 620, 626 (5th Cir. 1998) (“the
common issues in this case . . . are not only significant, but also pivotal”).
116
These include “the class members’ interests in individually controlling” their claim; the
extent and nature of litigation already begun; and whether it is desirable to concentrate the
litigation in the particular forum. See Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 23 23(b)(3)(A) (C).

various ways in individual actions.117 Furthermore, deciding the issue in a separate
collective action does not present manageability challenges. Deciding it in a
separate action instead simplifies and advances actions for individual relief.118
Although other factors “pertinent” to superiority may weigh against certification
in some cases,119 there is no non formalistic argument of any merit for never
using the Rule 23 (c)(4) provision to make Title VII litigation more efficient and fair
through issue severance.120
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The predominance inquiry involves not a comparison of number of issues, but rather
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agency based liability principles apply, and the employer has not made good faith efforts to
comply with Title VII. Id. at 538, 545 546. In a systemic disparate treatment case, all of these
prerequisites present common issues that can be decided most efficiently and fairly in one case
rather than in numerous individual cases. A jury empaneled for a (b)(3) systemic disparate
treatment case could decide whether the employer’s conduct was not only illegal, but also
subject to liability for punitive damages. This jury also might set a multiplier factor that could be
applied to successful individual claims for other monetary relief consistent with the maximum
allowed by the caps on compensatory and punitive damages set by the 1991 Act. 2 U.S.C. §
1981A(b)(3). As explained by the court in Ellis v. Costco, supra note xx, at 540 544, having the
availability of punitive damages determined by the same jury that determines the existence of a
pattern or practice of discrimination would avoid potential Seventh Amendment problems
posed by subsequent juries reexamining findings of the (b)(3) liability jury because the
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The management attorneys have not done so. Although Professor Hines criticizes using
“issue class actions as an alternative to non predominating (b)(3) class actions” to achieve
“automatic predominance,” Hines, supra note 111, at 723, she seems to accept applying the
(b)(3) standards to the full action after use of the (c)(4) issue class tool. Id. at 725 728.

Contrary to the claims of some management attorneys,121 certification of
Title VII (b)(3) issue classes is not prevented by the Court’s post Wal Mart
decision in Comcast Corp. v. Behrend,122 a case involving antitrust claims of a class
of consumers in a regional product market. The Court in Comcast stated that
before certifying (b)(3) classes courts must provide the same “rigorous analysis”
to the requirement of predominance that the Wal Mart decision required be
given to commonality under (a)(2).123 This rigorous analysis, the Court held, must
include consideration of whether “[q]uestions of individual damage calculations
will inevitably overwhelm questions common to the class.”124 The Court held that
the district court certifying the class in Comcast failed to apply this strict standard
because plaintiffs did not offer an efficient means to calculate damages flowing
from the theory of antitrust liability that the district court recognized could
potentially establish liability to all members of the requested class of
consumers.125
As stressed by the Comcast dissenters, however, the majority opinion
“should not be read to require, as a prerequisite to certification, that damages
attributable to a class wide injury be measurable on a class wide basis.”126 As the
dissent also noted, lower courts in a range of cases have held that individual
damage calculations do not normally preclude (b)(3) class certification.127 What
made the Comcast certification special, beyond the fact that “the need to prove
damages on a class wide basis” was not challenged by the plaintiffs,128 was the
lack of a demonstrated connection between the theory of common liability
121
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accepted by the district court for class litigation and the proof of individual
damages; proof of antitrust liability to all class members under the theory
recognized as viable by the court would not have been a basis for moving forward
the individual claims for damages because the plaintiffs offered no method to
isolate for individual class members the antitrust impact accepted by the district
court for class treatment from other “distortions” of a pure competitive market
that the plaintiff’s expert attributed to the defendant’s actions.129 Thus, the
plaintiffs’ liability case was not consistent with and could not advance their claim
for damages.
By contrast, under the Teamsters two phase model for Title VII pattern and
practice litigation, proof of liability based on a discriminatory pattern or practice is
consistent with and would advance the adjudication of individual claims for
monetary relief. Those individual claims might or might not make unmanageable
litigation of the entire action in one court, but proof of a general practice of
discrimination would still be the predominant issue in the action, and the
manageability problem could be mitigated by the use of an issue class for the
general liability issue. Nothing in the Comcast decision, like nothing in the Wal
Mart decision, calls into question such a use of (c)(4) to make class certification an
efficient and fair tool for litigation.130
129

Id. at 1433 1434.
There also is nothing in the Wal Mart or Comcast decisions suggesting that the Seventh
Amendment would restrict litigating through a (b)(3) issue class only the determination of
whether the employer engaged in a pattern or practice of discrimination, leaving damage
calculations to subsequent cases before different juries. The reexamination clause of the
Seventh Amendment prohibits any reconsideration in a subsequent case of what has been
decided by a jury: “no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise reexamined in any Court of the
United States ... .” Separate juries thus cannot decide the same issue. The Teamsters two phase
system, however, fully separates the issue of the existence of a pattern or practice of
discrimination from the issues that must be decided to determine which members of the
plaintiff’s class actually have been affected by any such discriminatory pattern or practice and
to what extent those affected have been harmed. The second remedial phase only proceeds if a
pattern or practice is demonstrated, and where it has been demonstrated, its existence is
accepted as an unchallengeable premise for litigation in the second phase. Nothing has
changed since Professor Hart’s explanation in Melissa Hart, Will Employment Class Actions
Survive, 37 Akron L. Rev. 813, 831 833 (2004).
130

In sum, the Wal Mart decision’s predictably restrictive interpretation of
Rule 23 need not pose insuperable barriers to private class actions under Title VII.
Its pronouncements, on both subsection (a)(2) and subsection (b)(2), should not
have been a surprise to the plaintiff’s bar, and even its most troublesome dicta
against “Trial by Formula” need not be heard and has not been heard as a death
knell for Title VII class actions.
The Roberts Court, however, through aggressive interpretations of the FAA
has offered most private employers the option of foreclosing such actions. It is
these interpretations, much more than the Wal Mart decision, that Congress
must address if class actions are to play an effective role in the enforcement of
Title VII’s commands.
V. Arbitration as a Class Action Barrier
The Court’s use of the FAA to erode the private right of action offered not
only by Title VII, but also by other federal anti employment discrimination laws
and employee protection laws, began about the time Congress attempted to
strengthen Title VII through passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1991. In Gilmer v.
Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.,131 a closely divided Court held that an employer
could enforce an employee’s agreement to process in private arbitration rather
than in court a claim under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA),132
even though the agreement was not negotiated and had to be signed as a
condition of the employee’s employment.133 The agreement enforced in Gilmer
was imposed by a third party regulator;134 however, a decade later the Court
confirmed that the FAA covers most employment contracts in Circuit City Stores,
Inc. v. Adams,135 a state anti discrimination law case challenging an agreement to
arbitrate imposed by Circuit City’s employment application. The Circuit City Court
131
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“any controversy” with his employer. Id.
135
532 U.S. 105 (2001).
132

interpreted “involving commerce” in the FAA’s operative section 2136 to cover all
employment contracts subject to Congressional regulation outside the
transportation industry,137 even though the FAA was enacted in 1925 before the
Court expanded Congress’ power to regulate interstate commerce, and even
though section 1 of the FAA exempts “contracts” not only of “seamen” and
“railroad employees,” but also “any other class of workers engaged in foreign or
interstate commerce.”138 There is nothing in Gilmer or Circuit City Stores that
suggests the Court would treat differently obligations imposed on employees by
their employers to arbitrate Title VI claims and the courts of appeals without
dissent now accept such impositions.139
Providing employers with the discretion to require their employees to
accept the redirection of statutory anti discrimination claims from judicial to
private arbitral forums also would seem to enable employers to require their
employees to sacrifice bringing any collective action in a judicial rather than in an
arbitral forum. More recent decisions of the Roberts Court, moreover, have
clarified that employers also can require employees to agree to only individual
arbitrations and thus to sacrifice the option of bringing a collective action in any
forum.
136
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There are two important limitations on the force of the FAA, both
potentially applicable to employment contracts, and both potentially protective
of employees’ ability to press actions collectively, at least in arbitration. First,
section two of the FAA includes a savings clause that allows the invalidation or
non enforcement of arbitration agreements on “grounds as exist at law or in
equity for the revocation of any contract.”140 Since such grounds include a
contract being unconscionable, section two might provide one tool to limit the
FAA’s restriction of collective actions. Second, the Court has iterated in numerous
decisions that the FAA allows only the waiver of a procedural right to a judicial
forum, not the waiver of any substantive rights; thus, a “prospective litigant”
must be able to “effectively vindicate” a “federal statutory right in the arbitral
forum.”141 If a substantive right guaranteed by Title VII or by another anti
discrimination statue cannot be “effectively vindicated” in an individual action,
perhaps because of its low potential value, compelling individual arbitration could
be treated as compelling the sacrifice of a substantive rather than only of a
procedural right.
In light of recent decisions of the Roberts Court, however, neither limitation
on the force of the FAA can be used to preserve employees’ ability to bring
collective actions, even in arbitration, simply because of the relatively low value
of individual discrimination claims. First, in AT & T Mobility LLC v. Vincent
Corporation,142 a narrowly divided Court, in a predictable alignment, held that
California’s unconscionability doctrine could not be applied to condition
enforcement of an imposed agreement to arbitrate on the imposing party’s
consent to class based or collective arbitration.143 The Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals had found an arbitration agreement in AT & T’s “Terms and Conditions”
for wireless service both procedurally and substantively unconscionable under
140
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California law because it precluded class actions through a contract of adhesion
and thereby allowed the company “to deliberately cheat large numbers of
consumers out of individually small sums of money.”144 Justice Scalia, writing for
the majority, asserted that despite the savings clause in section 2, the FAA can
preempt state law that, although neutral on its face, is “applied in a fashion that
disfavors arbitration.”145 Thus, California’s unconscionability law cannot be used
as “an obstacle to the accomplishment of the FAA’s objectives,” and “[r]equiring
the availability of classwide arbitration interferes with fundamental attributes of
arbitration,” and discourages its adoption.146 Class arbitration, Scalia argued,
“sacrifices the principal advantage of arbitration its informality – and makes
the process slower, more costly, and more likely to generate procedural morass
than final judgment.”147 Furthermore, class wide arbitration poses risks beyond
even those posed by class wide litigation for defendants because of the absence
of close and multilayered judicial review.148 Despite Justice’s Scalia’s attacks on
class arbitration, however, he left the door ajar to an “effective vindication”
argument in a response to the dissenting Justices’ argument that class
proceedings are necessary to ensure the prosecution of small claims: AT & T’s
agreement, Justice Scalia noted, provided that it would pay claimants “a minimum
of $7,500 and twice their attorney’s fees if they obtain an arbitration award
greater than AT & T’s last settlement offer.”149
Two years later in American Express Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant,150 the
Court nonetheless slammed the door shut on the “effective vindication”
argument as a basis for preserving the option for class wide arbitration of claims
that are otherwise not economically viable. In this case Italian Colors and other
merchants brought a class wide action in court against American Express, alleging
that Amex’s credit “card acceptance agreement” violated antitrust law. The Court,
144
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in another predictable 5 4 alignment, held that the merchants could not bring the
action because the agreement included a commitment to arbitrate claims without
use of class arbitration.151 The merchants contended that enforcing the class
waiver would prevent the “effective vindication” of their rights because none of
the merchants individually would have an adequate economic incentive to pay for
the expert analysis necessary to prove the claim.152 Justice Scalia, again writing for
the majority, rejected any argument based on economic incentives, narrowly
construing the “effective vindication” doctrine to apply only if there was an
obstruction of access to a forum to vindicate the rights.153 Justice Scalia asserted
that the high cost of proving a statutory claim is distinct from the “elimination of
the right to pursue the remedy.”154 He instead concluded that “FAA’s command to
enforce arbitration agreements trumps any interest in ensuring the prosecution
of low value claims.”155
Thus, as long as the waivers preserve formal access to some forum,
employees cannot abrogate imposed waivers to litigate or arbitrate individual
claims jointly by demonstrating that they cannot achieve “effective vindication”
through individual actions. If such formal access is preserved, the “effective
vindication” doctrine only guarantees collective or class litigation or arbitration of
collective rather than individual rights. If the right only can be asserted
collectively, then a waiver of collective or class litigation and arbitration would
constitute a waiver of a substantive rather than only a procedural right.
Title VII, however, provides no private collective action. Section 707 of the
Act authorizes the government, but not private victims of illegal discrimination, to
bring actions against “a pattern or practice of resistance” to the Act’s
antidiscrimination commands.156 Title VII private class actions are aggregations of
the private individual civil actions that are authorized under section 706(f) when
151
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the government chooses not to settle or litigate a charge of discrimination.157 The
Court’s development and use of the same two phase Franks Teamsters
procedural model in private section 706 class actions,158 as well as in public
section 707 actions, does not convert the substantive rights asserted in the
former into a general collective right like that asserted in the latter. Nor does such
a conversion derive from the lower courts not accepting use of this procedural
model in non collective private actions.159 Similarly, the 1991 Act’s codification of
the disparate impact “unlawful employment practice” 160 did not include any
provision for a collective substantive right to be asserted independently of the
individual actions authorized under section 706(f).
Thus, the Court through its interpretations of the FAA, rather than through
its interpretation of Rule 23, has provided employers outside the transportation
industry with a clear route to escape class and other forms of collective actions
under Title VII or other employment regulatory statutes. Employee rights activists,
like consumer advocates and shareholder activists, should give priority to the
modification of the FAA, rather than to the modification of Rule 23.
Given the alignment of the current Court, a comprehensive modification
will have to come from Congressional action. It will not derive from the clever
recent attempt of the National Labor Relations Board to dilute the Court’s FAA
jurisprudence for employment law. The Board first held in D.R. Horton, Inc.161 in
2012, and then reaffirmed in Murphy Oil USA, Inc.,162 in October, 2014, that
employers violate the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) by requiring their
employees to waive the right to bring collective actions in either a judicial or an
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alternative arbitral forum.163 This holding has not been accepted in any Court of
Appeals164 and would be rejected by the current Supreme Court.
To be sure, the NLRA secures from employer interference the right to
engage in “concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other
mutual aid or protection,”165 and employers cannot condition employment on an
individual employee’s willingness to waive that right in whole or in part.166
Furthermore, the Board has long appropriately understood litigation as an activity
that can take a protected concerted form.167 Employers thus cannot condition
employment on employees’ willingness to commit to not take concerted action to
utilize, secure, or expand any available procedural rights to engage in collective
adjudications.
The NLRA’s substantive protection of employees’ concerted utilization of
procedural rights does not mean that the NLRA requires employers to grant
particular procedural adjudicatory rights, however.168 The NLRA itself neither
163
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guarantees any right to proceed collectively in a judicial or arbitral forum nor
assumes any such right exists. Rule 23, for instance, was not even adopted until
several decades after the enactment of the NLRA.169 Indeed, before D. R. Horton
the Board had never interpreted the NLRA to require employers to participate
with multiple employees in any particular procedural system short of the
collective bargaining with a majority representative that the Act directly
protects.170 Thus, the NLRA’s substantive protection of employee utilization of
collective adjudication depends on the availability of such adjudication as defined
by external procedural law, including Rule 23, which the Court in its decisions
interpreting the FAA has held is subject to modification in employment contracts
with both individual employees171 and collective bargaining representatives.172
The Court that decided Circuit City Stores, Concepcion, and Italian Colors – albeit
all wrongly in my view will not allow the Board to expand NLRA guaranteed
rights for the purposes of advancing the procedure of collective adjudication. The
Court has made clear that the FAA, not any other federal statute, sets the
procedural rules governing arbitration of employment contracts within its scope.
Since the Court will not allow a federal agency, or any lower court, to mark
a route to circumvent the Court’s FAA jurisprudence, the plaintiffs’ employment
bar and civil rights advocates should join forces with many other interested
parties, including consumer advocates and other class action lawyers, to seek a
legislative modification of the FAA. Such a modification in the FAA, not in Rule 23,
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should be given priority.173 Even in the absence of a post Wal Mart amendment,
Rule 23 can be employed by realistic and pragmatic lawyers as an effective tool in
the enforcement of Title VII.
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Congress already has passed legislation restricting pre dispute agreements to arbitrate certain types of
employee claims. See Dodd Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1514(e)(2)
(rendering invalid pre dispute agreements requiring arbitration of certain whistleblower claims under federal law);
Dept. of Defense Appropriations Act, 2010 Pub. L. No. 111 118, § 8116 (prohibiting federal defense contractors
with contracts of over a $1,000,000 from conditioning employment on agreement to arbitrate Title VII claims or
tort claims involving sexual assault or harassment). See also Exec. Order 13,673, § 6 (July 31, 2014) (requiring
federal contractors with contracts exceeding $1,000,000 to agree not to arbitrate Title VII claims or tort claims for
sexual assault or harassment absent a voluntary post dispute agreement).

